Article I, Section 1:
Ramirez v. State Bd. of Dentistry, 308 A.3d 368 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2024), per Wallace, J., the Commonwealth Court held that a statute requiring a dentist to obtain a degree from an accredited institution did not violate the state constitution. Article I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania constitution provides that all people have the right to possess property and pursue happiness, which includes the right to pursue one’s chosen occupation. A statute violates the right to pursue a chosen occupation if it is unreasonable, unduly oppressive, beyond the necessities of the case, or overly broad. However, the court found that the government had a valid interest in protecting the public by ensuring dentists have adequate education and that the statutory requirement was reasonable.
Interest of J.H., 2024 WL 2891417 (Pa. Super. Ct. Jun. 10, 2024), per Sullivan, J., the Superior Court held that the trial court erred in ordering the mother in a private dependency petition to undergo a mental health examination. The Superior Court held that mental health evaluations in the dependency context should be analyzed pursuant to Article I, Section 1 of the state Constitution. The court found that the trial court erred because the trial court did not balance the mother’s privacy interests against the state’s interests.
S.E.N. v. Dept. of Educ., — A.3d –, 2024 WL 3957650 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2024), per Wallace, J., the Commonwealth Court held that the immediate suspension of a teacher’s certification after she allowed a convicted sex offender into her home did not violate the Pennsylvania Constitution. The court found that the teacher’s poor judgment and failure to protect her own child had direct bearing on her ability to safeguard students. The court held that the suspension was reasonable and did not violate the teacher’s constitutional rights to due process, free speech, or reputation.
In re Thirtieth Cnty. Investigating Grand Jury, — A.3d –, 2024 WL 4559260 (Pa. 2024), per Mundy, J., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a grand jury report criticizing unindicted individuals violated the rights to reputation established in Article I, Section 1, which is protected by due process in the Pennsylvania Constitution. The court found that individuals criticized in grand jury reports but not indicted faced significant harm to their reputations and the failure to provide notice and an opportunity to respond to any criticisms in the report violated their constitutional rights.
Article I, Section 5:
Center for Coalfield Justice v. Washington Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 2024 WL 4272040 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. Sept. 24, 2024), per Wojcik, J., the Commonwealth Court held that Pennsylvania’s due process clause offers broader protections than the federal constitution and emphasized voters’ fundamental right to participate in elections. Article I, Section 5 of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantees free and equal elections. The court found that the county Board of Elections’s policy of withholding notification from voters whose ballots were segregated for disqualification unconstitutionally deprived them of the opportunity to challenge or correct their ballot issues, which contravened due process requirements.
New PA Project Educ. Fund v. Schmidt, 2024 WL 4410884 (Pa. Oct. 5, 2024), per Brobson, J., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to exercise the King’s Bench jurisdiction to rule on whether mail-in ballots missing or containing an incorrect date on the return enveloper violate Article I, Section 5 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which guarantees free and equal elections. The court reasoned that making substantial changes to elections laws mid-process could lead to confusion and disrupt the ongoing election.
Baxter v. Philadelphia Bd. of Elections, 2024 WL 4614689 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. Oct. 30, 2024), per Ceisler, J., the Commonwealth Court held that rejecting mail ballots solely due to undated or incorrectly dated declarations violates the Free and Equal Elections Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The court found that the dating requirement is “meaningless” and does not affect voter eligibility or prevent voter fraud. Applying strict scrutiny, the court held that there was no compelling government interest to justify disenfranchising voters for minor administrative errors. The Commonwealth Court’s order was stayed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on November 1, 2024.
Article I, Section 7:
Commonwealth v. Leschinskie, — A.3d –, 2024 WL 5195378 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2024), per Colins, J., the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that a statute prohibiting the use of audio or video devices in court proceedings did not violate either the First Amendment or Article I, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The court noted that although the Pennsylvania Constitution offers greater protection than the First Amendment for content-based speech restrictions, it does not provide greater protection when evaluating content-neutral restrictions. Because the court found the prohibition of audio or video devices was content-neutral, it found it to be constitutional as it served the significant interest of maintaining the integrity and security of judicial proceedings without unnecessarily restricting protected speech.
Article I, Section 8:
Commonwealth v. Saunders, 326 A.3d 888 (Pa. 2024), per Dougherty, J., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a warrantless seizure of a firearm that was in plain view was constitutional because the police officer had probable cause. The court found that the seizure did not violate the Pennsylvania Constitution’s prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures in Article I, Section 8 because the firearm was in plain view and the officer had lawful access to it. The court distinguished the case from prior cases that required both probable cause and exigent circumstances for warrantless vehicle searches and found that the unexpected development of probable cause justified the seizure.
Commonwealth v. Brinson, — A.3d –, 2024 WL 5037054 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2024), per King, J., the Pennsylvania Superior Court upheld the suppression of evidence seized at an extended traffic stop as it found the search and seizure unconstitutional under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The court found that the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the stop and request a K-9 unit solely based on the nervous demeanor of the vehicle’s occupants without any other facts indicating criminal activity. The court rejected the Commonwealth’s reliance on the inevitable discovery doctrine, ruling that the physical evidence obtained during the stop was inadmissible.
Article I, Section 9:
Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 2024 WL 97339 (Pa. Super. Ct. Jan. 9, 2024), per Bowes, J., the Superior Court held that although a prosecutor improperly discussed during trial that the defendant retained counsel prior to his arrest, such conduct did not amount to a mistrial. The court found that the misconduct was cured because the judge instructed the jury to avoid making any adverse inferences regarding the fact that the defendant exercised his right to counsel under the 6th Amendment. Lazarus, J., dissented and would have found that the prosecutor’s comments infringed upon the defendant’s invocation of his right to counsel and that such infringement was not cured by the trial judge’s instruction because the Pennsylvania Constitution protects even mere internet searches for an attorney.
Commonwealth v. Pulizzi, 2024 WL 1553814 (Pa. Super. Ct. Apr. 10, 2024), per Sullivan, J., the Superior Court held that the defendant had a constitutional right to cross-examine a victim regarding the victim’s sexual offenses at trial in order to challenge the victim’s credibility. Article I, Section 9 of the state constitution guarantees a defendant the right to confront witnesses. The court found that the jury had the right to know that the witness had reported the defendant for sexual offenses four years after the events at issue and only after the witness himself was charged with unrelated sexual offenses.
Commonwealth v. Jones, — A.3d –, 2024 WL 4559503 (Pa. 2024), per Donohue, J., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the admission of a non-testifying co-defendant’s redacted confession implicating the defendant violated the Confrontation Clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. While the majority opinion analyzed the Confrontation Clause of both constitutions synonymously, Justice Wecht wrote in his concurrence that the Pennsylvania Constitution provides broader protection than the United States Constitution and thus requires a stricter standard for admitting redacted confessions in joint trials.
Article I, Section 11:
Schmidt v. Pa. Dept. of Transportation, — A.3d –, 2024 WL 4469343 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2024), per Dumas, J., the Commonwealth Court held that the Department of Transportation (“DOT”) is protected by sovereign immunity where a tree was rooted on SEPTA property but a branch extended over a DOT-controlled roadway, fell, and caused a fatal accident. Article I, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides that the Commonwealth and its entities, such as DOT, are generally immune from lawsuits unless the legislature specifically waives immunity. The court found that the real estate exception, which is a statutory waiver to sovereign immunity, did not apply.
Article I, Section 14:
Commonwealth v. Yard, — A.3d –, 2024 WL 4297112 (Pa. 2024), per Mundy, J., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the constitutional evidentiary standard of “proof is evident or presumption great” does not apply to the life-offense or capital offense exceptions to the right to bail under Article I, Section 14. The court found that the text of Article I, Section 14 unambiguously limits the evidentiary standard solely to the dangerousness exception. The court held that when an individual is charged with an offense carrying a life sentence, the Constitution categorically prohibits bail without requiring the Commonwealth to meet an additional evidentiary threshold.
Article I, Section 21:
Gun Owners of America, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, __ A.3d __, 2024 WL 648720 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2024), per Ceisler, J., the Commonwealth Court held that the petitioner had waived its right to raise a Article I, Section 21 challenge to an ordinance because it had failed to adequately brief and analyze the issue. The court stated that in interpreting a provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution, it is not bound by the decision of the United States Supreme Court interpreting similar yet distinct federal constitutional provisions. In doing so, the court must consider the text of the Pennsylvania provision, the history of the provision, related case-law from other states, and policy considerations and applicability within modern Pennsylvania jurisprudence. Because the petitioner failed to conduct the mandatory analysis of such factors, it failed to satisfy its obligation and waived its ability to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance.
Article II, Section 1:
City of Lancaster v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, — A.3d –, 2024 WL 1776508 (Pa. 2024), per Brobson, J., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court unanimously overruled the Commonwealth Court’s decision that Section 59.18 of the Public Utility Commission’s (“PUC”) regulations was unconstitutional. The court found that the legislature did not vest the PUC with any legislative authority under Article II, Section 1 of the state constitution. Rather, Section 59.18 is merely a regulatory act under the PUC’s administrative authority to limit the placement of gas meters in certain location for the safety of the public.
Crawford v. Commonwealth, 326 A.3d 850 (Pa. 2024), per Brobson, J., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Uniform Firearms Act and the Home Rule Charter and Optional Plans Law, which prohibit local governments from enacting or enforcing ordinances regulating the ownership, transportation, possession, or transfer of firearms, did not violate the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Court determined that the laws did not deprive individuals of their constitutional right under Article I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution to enjoy and defend life and liberty. The court reaffirmed the General Assembly’s plenary power under Article II, Section 1 of the state Constitution, emphasizing its supremacy over municipalities, which as creations of the state, have no inherent powers and are limited by enabling legislation, constitutional provision, and state law.
Article II, Sections 2 & Section 4:
Krasner v. Ward, — A.3d –, 2024 WL 4293935 (Pa. 2024), per Todd, J., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the political-question doctrine did not bar judicial review of the articles of impeachment brought against a district attorney from a legislative session that has since expired. The court found that the expiration of the legislative session that issued the impeachment articles rendered them void, as each General Assembly session operates within a limited timeframe under Article II, Section 2 and 4 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Article II, Section 5:
Commonwealth ex rel. Ziccarelli v. Geiger, 2024 WL 4024229 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Sept. 3, 2024), per Jubelirer, J., the Commonwealth Court upheld the removal of the constable of Arona Borough after he temporarily moved out of the borough due to divorce proceedings. Article II, Section 5 of the Pennsylvania Constitution requires that elected officials reside in the district in which they are elected during the term of their service. The court found that his absence and the lack of evidence supporting his intent to return disqualified him from holding the office.
Article II, Section 7:
Tim Zyla, DA Petitions Court to Remove Franklin as Wysox Township Supervisor, The Daily Review (Towanda, PA) (Dec. 23, 2024), Tim Zyla writes that Bradford County District Attorney Richard Wilson filed a complaint seeking to have Wysox Township Supervisor Victor Franklin removed from office following a felony conviction relating to child pornography. Wilson’s basis for filing the suit is Article II, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which prohibits persons committed of infamous crimes from holding office in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
Article II, Section 15:
Exchange 12, LLC v. Palmer Township, 2024 WL 2925971 (E.D. Pa. Jun. 10, 2024), per Schmehl, J., the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that the Pennsylvania Speech and Debate Clause did not shield a township solicitor’s alleged remark referring to a business owner as a “terrorist” from discovery in litigation. The district court found that the solicitor’s remark was discoverable because the Speech and Debate Clause does not shield the solicitor, although a state legislator, from a violation of federal law and because the comment was not made in any type of legislative drafting or action.
Article III, Section 32:
Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Association, Inc. v. Campbell, 310 A.3d 271 (Pa. 2024), per Mundy, J., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Pennsylvania’s Right to Know Law’s (“RTKL”) inclusion of the Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Association (“PIAA”) as a “state-affiliated entity” does not violate Article III, Section 32 of the state constitution. Article III, Section 32 provides that the “General Assembly shall pass no local or special law in any case which has been or can be provided by general law,” and has been interpreted to prohibit legislation limited to a specific class of identifiable members, where that class is closed to future membership. The court found that the RTKL does not create a closed class as it includes a general definition of a “state-affiliated entity,” which is followed by a list of examples that is inclusive of the PIAA. Further, the court determined that the PIAA was a “state-affiliated entity” as defined by the RTKL and would be subject to the law even if it was not specifically named as an example.
Article IV, Section 9:
Stewart v. Pennsylvania, 2024 WL 53012 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2024), per Baylson, J., the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that a prisoner does not have a liberty interest in the possibility of commutation. Article IV, Section 9 of the state constitution states that the governor may commute or pardon any sentence after a favorable recommendation from the Board of Pardons. Although the prisoner’s application for commutation was approved, he did not have a liberty interest because his commutation remained only a possibility until decided upon by the governor.
Article IV, Section 20:
Lara v. Comm. Pa. State Police, 91 F.4th 122 (3d Cir. 2024), per Jordan, J., the Third Circuit held that a case challenging the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act of 1995 (“UFA”) was not moot. The relevant part of the UFA provides that “[n]o person shall carry a firearm upon public streets or upon any public property during an emergency proclaimed by a State or municipal governmental executive.” When the suit was filed in October 2020, Pennsylvania had been in an uninterrupted state of emergency for nearly three years which had the practical effect of preventing most 18-to-20-year-olds from carrying firearms. However, Pennsylvania had recently amended the state Constitution to limit the governor’s authority to issue emergency declarations to twenty-one days. The Third Circuit held that the case was not moot because Pennsylvania’s recent history of declaring multiple emergencies made it reasonably likely that other 18-to-20-year-olds would be banned from carrying guns in public again and that there would not be enough time to litigate a claim if the emergency lasted only twenty-one days.
Article V, Section 3:
N.W.M. Through J.M. v. Langenbach, — A.3d –, 2024 WL 2788173 (Pa. 2024), per Wecht, J., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Article V, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution does not limit the Superior Court from ruling upon a legal issue of first impression involving “policy” considerations. The Supreme Court found that the Superior Court can, and should, use its judgment to decide legal issues within the judicial domain.
Article V, Section 17:
In re Prospect Crozer LLC, — A.3d –, 2024 WL 5132101 (Pa. 2024), per Donohue, J., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a senior judge’s simultaneous service on the city’s Board of Revision of Taxes and in the judiciary violated Article V, Section 17 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which prohibits judges from holding incompatible offices. The court found that this conflict of duties necessitated the judge’s disqualification from tax assessment matters as it was unconstitutional and undermined public confidence in the judiciary.
Article VI, Section 7:
Montemuro v. Jim Thorpe Area School Dist., 99 F.4th 639 (3d Cir. 2024), per Jordan, C.J, the Third Circuit held that school board presidents, as state employees, have a protected property interest in their jobs under Article VI, Section 7 of the state constitution. Article VI, Section 7 provides that civil officers may only be removed from office for cause. The court found that because the Jim Thorpe Area School Board removed its president without notice, it violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Martin v. Donegal Twp., — A.3d –, 2024 WL 4557856 (Pa. 2024), per Dougherty, J., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Section 402(e) of the Second Class Township Code, which allows a reduction of township supervisors from five to three via referendum, did not violate the Pennsylvania Constitution. The court held that the reduction in the number of supervisors did not constitute an unconstitutional removal of elected officials under Article VI, Section 7 because the reduction altered the structure of governance rather than improperly removing elected officials.
Article VII, Section 4:
Honey v. Lycoming Cnty. Offices of Voter Servs., __ A.3d __, 2024 WL 899748 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2024), per Ceisler, J., the Commonwealth Court held that a Cast Vote Record (“CVR”) was not exempt from public disclosure under Section 308 of Pennsylvania’s Right to Know Law because the CVR was not the contents of ballot boxes and voting machines. Wallace, J., wrote in dissent that Section 308 may serve to promote secrecy in voting, as expressly provided by Article VII, Section 4 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. However, Judge Wallace writes this concern is alleviated by the fact that the CVR in dispute lacks identifying information and is randomized.
Article VII, Section 14:
[VACATED] Zimmerman v. Schmidt, 2024 WL 3979110 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Aug. 23, 2024), per Jubelirer, J., the Commonwealth Court held that the state’s practice of canvassing absentee ballots at the county level, as outlined in Pennsylvania’s Election Code, is constitutional although Article VII, Section 14 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides that absentee ballots should be canvassed in the district where the elector resides. The Commonwealth’s holding was vacated by the Supreme Court on September 9, 2024.
Article VIII, Section 1:
Natl. Hockey League Players Assoc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 308 A.3d 318 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2024), per Ceisler, J., the Commonwealth Court held that a statute imposing a “facility tax” on nonresident individuals who use a facility to engage in an athletic activity violated the Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Uniformity Clause requires that taxes be uniform upon the same class of subjects and is violated when the method for computing a tax produces arbitrary, unjust or unreasonably discriminatory results. The court found that the “facility tax” was unconstitutional because there was not a concrete justification for treating residents and nonresidents as distinguishable classes that may be subjected to different tax burdens.
Article VIII, Section 2:
Goodwill Indus. of North Central PA, Inc. v. Centre Cnty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, — A.3d –, 2024 WL 3927665 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2024), per McCullough, J., the Commonwealth Court held that Goodwill was entitled to a real estate tax exemption for its property because it qualified as a public charity under Article VIII, Section 2 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The court found that Goodwill qualifies as a public charity because it donates or renders a substantial portion of its services gratuitously and does not use its property in a manner that competes with commercial enterprises.